Users today share a great deal of private information on the Web. While HTTPS protects this data during transmission, it does not protect data at rest, nor does it protect user data from the websites which store or transmit that data. These issues can be addressed with user-to-user encryption, an approach where data is encrypted and decrypted at the user's computer and is opaque to websites. In this paper we present MessageGuard, the first system that retrofits the Web with user-to-user encryption and is designed to work with all websites, in all browsers, on all platforms. We demonstrate that MessageGuard operates out-of-the-box on 47 of the Alexa top 50 sites, has minimal performance overhead, and is rated as highly usable by study participants.
INTRODUCTION
Users today share a great deal of private information on the Web and do so through a variety of applications (e.g., email, instant messaging, social media, document sharing). HTTPS can be used to protect this information during transmission, but does not protect users' data while at rest. Additionally, middleboxes can weaken HTTPS connections by failing to properly implement TLS or adequately validate certificate chains [23] . Ultimately, even if a website correctly employs HTTPS and encrypts user data while at rest, the user's data is still vulnerable in a number of ways -honestbut-curious websites that mine user data [30] , misbehaving third-party libraries [34] , compromise of the website's back end, poor protocol design and implementation [12] , and coerced information disclosure by governments.
This state of affairs motivates the need for user-to-user encryption, an approach in which data is encrypted and decrypted at each user's computer and is opaque to the websites that store or transmit this data. There are many use cases for user-to-user encryption. For example, two users can encrypt their email, preventing either of their email providers from accessing its contents. Similarly, users may want to encrypt sensitive files shared through DropBox or Google Drive. In some cases, a user may wish to be the only endpoint, such as when storing private items in a Web-based to-do list.
Significant work has been done to explore different dimensions of the user-to-user encryption problem. Some work examines protecting a single type of application. For example, BabelCrypt protects mobile messaging applications [40] . Other work has examined how a wide variety of websites might be protected in a single browser [11, 19] . There is also work that examines how browsers and websites might be modified in order to allow for user-to-user encryption [34] . While this work makes significant progress, it leaves open the question of whether a single approach could be used to provide user-to-user encryption for all websites and all browsers on today's Web.
In this paper, we present MessageGuard, the first system that retrofits the Web with user-to-user encryption and is designed to work with all websites, in all browsers, and on all desktop and mobile platforms. MessageGuard provides a security overlay that isolates plaintext from websites, so that only ciphertext is uploaded and stored on the website's back end. This approach works out-of-the-box for most existing websites, allowing MessageGuard to scale with the ever-increasing number of applications on the Web. In rare cases where the default overlay does not work, or if additional functionality is desired, MessageGuard can be customized for a specific website.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• An analysis and comparison of the various implementation strategies for retrofitting the Web with user-touser encryption. We propose two new hybrid strategies that address limitations in existing strategies and maximize deployability, security, and usability.
• The design of MessageGuard, a user-to-user encryption system that bridges the gap between the need for secure user-to-user communication and the capabilities of current browsers and websites. While other research has focused on a small subset of this problem space or requires significant modifications to browsers and websites, MessageGuard works everywhere and can be deployed today.
• An analysis of MessageGuard in terms of its deployability, performance, and usability. We show that MessageGuard works with 47 of the Alexa Top 50 websites (only one site needed customized functionality to get it to work, the other two were not testable). MessageGuard has little impact on page load times, consuming approximately 1% of load time for Facebook and 3% for Gmail. We evaluate MessageGuard for usability in a series of laboratory studies involving a total of 220 users, with MessageGuard receiving a SUS score of 80.0, putting it in the top 15% of systems previously tested using SUS [32] .
USER-TO-USER ENCRYPTION
In this section, we describe the threat model that motivates our work. We then discuss system goals necessary for retrofitting the Web with user-to-user encryption in a way that could be adopted by the masses. Next, we detail where user-to-user encryption needs to be implemented in order to be compatible with existing browsers. Finally, we discuss limitations inherent to retrofitting the Web with user-to-user encryption.
Threat Model
Our threat model is very closely aligned with the threat model for HTTPS [25] , except that in our case users are the endpoints and websites are considered to be a part of the network infrastructure that user-to-user messages traverse. We consider websites, middleboxes (e.g. CDNs), and the content they serve to be within the complete control of the adversary. The adversary wins if she is able to use these resources to access the user's sensitive data. While it is true that most websites are not malicious, 1 in order to retrofit the Web with user-to-user encryption it is necessary to also address those websites that are truly malicious. Users' computers, operating systems, software, and user-to-user encryption software 2 are all considered part of the trusted computing base in our threat model.
Since retrofitting the Web with user-to-user encryption does not allow modification of websites, and by extension the protocols they use, our threat model allows for the leakage of some meta-data, but requires that this meta-data does not compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of the messages passed between users. First, meta-data regarding the encrypted package is available to the adversary (e.g., length of the encrypted message).
3 Second, meta-data that is exposed by the website as it transmits or stores data is also available. For example, an encrypted email is still sent using the SMTP protocol and information revealed by that protocol (e.g., recipients, subject) will be available to the adversary.
System Goals
Based on an examination of existing work on encrypting user-to-user messages in specific applications (e.g., [41, 13, 33, 36] ) and our own experience in this area (i.e., [30, 31, 27, 28, 29] ), we have identified several key goals for systems retrofitting the Web with user-to-user encryption. These goals encompass deployment, security, and usability concerns.
Deployment
Goal1 Ubiquitous: Encryption should be available for all websites.
Goal2 Available: Encryption should available in all major desktop and mobile browsers.
Users want to continue using the websites they already use [30, 28] . While it may be impossible to fully retrofit the Web with user-to-user encryption (e.g., Flash applications or input fields drawn using an HTML canvas), standard HTML interfaces should all be supported and where possible nonstandard interfaces should also be handled. Similarly, users want to continue using their current devices and browsers, so encryption should be available on all major desktop and mobile browsers.
Security
Goal3 Secure: Encryption interfaces should be clearly distinguishable from the website's interface.
In addition to protecting user-to-user messages from websites, it is important that systems clearly delineate which interfaces belong to the website and which belong to the user-to-user encryption software. This helps users to feel assured that their data is being protected and assists them in avoiding mistakes [30, 27] . Additionally, visual indicators should be included that can help protect against an adversary that attempts to social engineer a user into believing they are entering text into a secure interface when in reality they are entering text directly into the adversary's interface [9, 6] .
Goal4 Automatic: Key management should be automatic and meet the needs of both novice and expert users.
Research has shown that users can successfully use encryption when key management is automatic [13, 30, 1] , but struggle otherwise [41, 33, 29] . Key management scheme(s) should meet the needs of both novice and expert users, though to date this is still an open problem area [36] .
Usability
Goal5 Simple: The system should be approachable to novice users.
Easy-to-use systems are more likely to be adopted by the public at large [36] . Furthermore, complicated systems foster user errors, decreasing system security [41, 30] . As such, a primary concern is to ensure that users are both willing to use the system and can do so correctly. At a minimum this includes the use of informative messages for first time recipients of a secure messages, intuitive interfaces, and integrated, content-sensitive tutorials [27, 28] . Goal6 Seamless: The system should integrate seamlessly with existing websites and avoid burdening the user.
Goal7 Reactive: The system should modify its interfaces to be usable for any dimensions.
Interfaces for user-to-user encryption should be integrated tightly with existing Web applications. Research has repeatedly demonstrated that users prefer this approach to interfaces that do not integrate with their existing web applications [30, 31, 1, 27] . Furthermore, these interfaces should react to the space available, providing appropriate functionality at any display size. Finally, it is important that the system should minimize the effect on the secured website's user experience; if encryption gets in the way of users completing tasks it is more likely that they will turn off user-to-user encryption [20] .
Goal8 Controllable: Users should control when and how their data is secured.
Research has shown that most users are not interested in encrypting all of their online data [14, 30] . As such, it is important that users be able to control when their data is encrypted.
Data Encryption Locations
With the above goals in mind, there are three locations where users' data can be encrypted (Figure 1 ).
At the website's back end.
The Web service can encrypt data before storing it to disk. While this improves over just using HTTPS, it does not provide user-to-user encryption and still leaves users open to vulnerabilities (e.g. honest-but-curious websites, misbehaving third-party libraries, compromise, and coercion). Furthermore, requiring all websites to implement back end encryption is not feasible.
2.
Between the website's front end and the network. There are two ways that this can be done: (a) the website's JavaScript could encrypt users' messages before transmission or (b) a user-supplied JavaScript plugin could encrypt a user's sensitive message before it is transmitted to the website. The problem with (a) is that in our threat model, the website is untrusted and cannot be relied upon to encrypt user-to-user messages. Furthermore, requiring all websites to implement (a) is not scalable.
There are two approaches to implement (b). First, a JavaScript plugin can perform taint analysis and ensure that any user-created data is encrypted before being sent to the website [21, 8] . Second, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) can be used to allow websites to collaborate with a JavaScript plugin in order to provide user-to-user encryption [34, 15] . A significant benefit of (b) is that it uses the websites' current interfaces without modification. Still, there are several problems that keep this from being an acceptable design choice:
i Browsers and websites must be modified to support this approach.
ii In practice, it is difficult to ensure that users' data is sufficiently protected while also allowing the website to function as intended [34] .
iii The implementation of the website and the JavaScript plugin is tightly coupled, implicitly trusting the website more than is allowed by our threat model.
3.
Between the website's front end and the user. Encrypting a user's sensitive data before it is ever passed to an adversary's website is the most reliable way to protect user's data. Additionally, since encryption occurs regardless of the underlying website, this approach is able to scale with the Web. This is the same approach taken by TLS, which encrypts data before it leaves an endpoint. This is the only approach that is compatible with our threat model (i.e., does not trust websites). Moreover, this approach can be accomplished without modifying current browsers or websites. As this is the only approach that satisfies our system goals, the remainder of this paper focuses on the type 3 approach.
Limitations
The following are limitations inherent to the type 3 approach. First, a Web service can perform a denial-of-service attack [22, 19] by refusing to store or transmit data that has been encrypted. 4 Alternatively, a website can attempt to disrupt a user-to-user encryption system's ability to secure the website.
Second, encrypted messages are opaque to the website, limiting the website's ability to provide any useful computation on the data (e.g., sorting data, context-sensitive ads). Additionally, any custom composition interfaces provided by the website (e.g., rich text editing) are unavailable when composing the encrypted message, and similar interfaces must be re-implemented by the encryption software.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
In line with our system goals, we examined approaches for encrypting sensitive data before it reaches the website. In this section, we review related work and analyze the implementation strategies used in that work with respect to our system goals (i.e., deployability, security, usability). We group the implementation strategies into two categories: integrated strategies and non-integrated strategies. We also propose two new hybrid strategies that address limitations in the existing strategies and are better suited to meet our system goals.
Integrated Strategies
Integrated strategies attempt to add user-to-user encryption directly to the interfaces of existing websites. In a process known as overlaying [37] , the browser can replace portions of the website's interface with secure interfaces known as overlays (Figure 2 ). These overlays are displayed as if 
iFrame
The oldest integrated strategy is to create overlays using HTML iFrames [37] . Since iFrames are a part of the browser's DOM, it is trivial to integrate them with websites. Further, iFrames are protected by the browser's same-origin policy. There are three methods for overlaying websites with iFrames:
1. Browser extension. Extensions are desktop only, except in the case of Firefox on Android.
2. Bookmarklet. Bookmarklets are user scripts that are stored as browser bookmarks. When a user clicks a bookmarklet, the associated script is executed on the current page. Bookmarklets are supported on all platforms, both desktop and mobile, and do not require users to install any software.
When using bookmarklets, the iFrame's src attribute will need to reference a trusted remote domain. To maximize security, this domain should only host the contents needed by the bookmarklet's user script. This limited functionality makes it easier to lock down the domain's servers in order to prevent an intrusion by the adversary.
Bookmarklets are affected by the browser's Content Security Policy (CSP), which can be used to limit the source of frames and scripts. Still, this limitation has been marked as a bug in Chromium 5 and Firefox, 6 and it is possible that in the future this limitation will be removed. In practice, only a small number of websites use CSP.
3. Proxy application. A proxy application can be used to augment the bookmarklet approach. First, it can modify the CSP settings of a website to allow iFrame's to reference the system's trusted domain. Second, a proxy can automatically inject the bookmarklet script into a webpage, obviating the need for the user to click the bookmarklet. Third, a proxy can allow the iFrame 5 https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/ detail?id=233903 6 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=866522 strategy to work with non-browser applications that display HTML interface elements retrieved from the Web. A proxy application can work on any platform, except for Windows on mobile devices. Still, there are two significant drawbacks to this approach: (1) for non-rooted phones, the proxy must be implemented using the phone's VPN service and (2) it must proxy HTTPS connections in order to modify their contents.
In prior work, we used iFrames to develop Pwm, a secure email client for the masses [30] . Pwm tightly integrated with Gmail and was designed to maximize usability. Pwm focused on helping first time recipients of an encrypted email understand how to install Pwm and decrypt their message. Pwm was rated as highly usable by participants in several usability studies. Since our work on Pwm, additional systems in both research [1] and industry (e.g., Virtru, Mailvelope) have also used the iFrame strategy to secure email.
Shadow DOM
Shadow DOM is a new feature proposed in the HTML5 specification, and currently has a partial implementation in blink-based browsers (e.g., Chrome). The Shadow DOM allows for the creation of a "shadow" DocumentFragment (i.e., ShadowRoot) that will be rendered in place of another fragment (i.e., host) on the website. Elements contained in the ShadowRoot are invisible to the rest of the DOM and must be accessed through their parent ShadowRoot. For example document.getElementById cannot find children of a ShadowRoot.
Overlays can be implemented using a ShadowRoot. However, while ShadowRoot objects and their contents should only be accessible to the entity that created the ShadowRoot object, in practice this is not the case:
1. The Shadow DOM allows for an element to have multiple ShadowRoots, with the newest ShadowRoot having access to older ShadowRoot objects through their olderShadowRoot property.
2. There are two CSS selectors that "pierce" the Shadow DOM. First the ">>>" selector can be used to grab any element that matches the selectors to the right of ">>>", regardless of whether that element is inside a ShadowRoot. Similarly, the "::shadow" pseudo-selector can be used to select the ShadowRoot attached to any element.
3. The Element.prototype.createShadowRoot method can be replaced by the Web application with a version that saves references to the created ShadowRoots, allowing the Web application to access the contents of these ShadowRoots.
In order to implement overlays using a ShadowRoot, it is necessary to modify the JavaScript environment to address these access methods [19] . Because of this limitation, ShadowDOM cannot be implemented using a bookmarklet, which cannot guarantee that the JavaScript environment is modified before the website has the ability to store pointers to these access methods. Instead, a Shadow DOM strategy must be implemented using either an extension or a proxy application.
He et al. used the Shadow DOM to implement ShadowCrypt, a Chrome extension that attempted to add secure communication to arbitrary websites [19] . In our experience, usability issues keep ShadowCrypt from working with most websites. Moreover, flaws in ShadowCrypt's implementation allow the website to retrieve the user's sensitive data (for further details see Section 3.3.3). This demonstrates the danger of relying on non-standard security models created by developers.
Greasemonkey
Greasemonkey is a Firefox plugin that allows for websites to be modified with custom interface elements defined using XUL. XUL interface elements can be used for overlays, and the contents of these interfaces are protected by the browser's sandboxing of websites [7] .
Fahl et al. used Greasemonkey to create a Firefox extension that added user-to-user encryption to Dropbox, Facebook, and email [10] . Their plugin used Confidentiality-asa-Service (CaaS) to automate key management. Usability studies demonstrate that their system was highly usable.
Accessibility
Most operating systems have an accessibility layer that is used by accessibility tools to modify apps to make them usable by individuals with disabilities. Lau et al. proposed using the accessibility layer to implement secure overlays [22] . In this strategy, the content of secure overlays is protected by the browser's sandbox. While our work is concerned with encrypting content within the browser, the accessibility layer is interesting in that it has the potential to secure non-browser applications. While iFrames implemented using a proxy application can also support non-browser applications, the accessibility layer has the potential to be more universal and reliable.
Lau et al. used this strategy to develop Mimesis Aegis (M-Aegis), a system for enhancing Android apps with userto-user encryption. Their system secured several communication apps (e.g., Gmail) and also provided a method for support to be added for additional apps.
7 A usability study of the Android Gmail app secured with M-Aegis showed that most participants did not report any noticeable difference between the original Gmail app and the Gmail app with M-Aegis enabled.
Non-integrated Strategies
In contrast to integrated strategies, non-integrated strategies use separate applications to provide encryption, relying on the user to copy-and-paste encrypted content in and out of the original application. Because these applications are not integrated with websites, they are free to make UI design choices that maximize usability, without any concern that these choices will clash with a website's UI.
Standalone Website
A standalone website can be used to handle encryption and decryption. While it is not integrated with websites, it is integrated with the browser. Since a browser is used to run the website, no installation is required. Security is provided by the browser's same-origin policy. This approach is not common, but there have been a few standalone websites that provide PGP encryption. 
Standalone Application
A standalone application is the traditional strategy for implementing user-to-user encryption. Security is provided by the operating system's app separation policies.
The earliest example of a standalone user-to-user encryption application is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). PGP was created in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman and is used to protect a wide range of data. Since then, many similar programs have been created.
Comparison
We have analyzed and compared each of the above strategies based on their deployability, usability, and security. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
Deployability
There are three key areas of deployability: which browsers are supported, which desktop operating systems are supported, and which mobile devices are supported. Both the Greasemonkey and Shadow DOM strategies are limited to a single type of browser, Firefox and blink-based, respectively. On mobile, Greasemonkey only works with Firefox on Android and the Shadow DOM requires the use of a proxy application, which as mentioned earlier is less than ideal (marked as "Partial support" in Table 1 ). Greasemonkey uses XUL, which is slated for deprecation. On the other hand, Shadow DOM is part of the HTML5 specification and there is a good chance that sometime in the future it will become standard in more browsers.
The deployment challenge faced by both the accessibility and standalone app strategy is that every platform, both desktop and mobile, requires its own implementation. For standalone apps, this burden could be reduced through the use of a cross-platform framework (e.g., Java, Mono), though these frameworks commonly lead to systems with a poor look-and-feel. Unfortunately, there is not a cross-platform accessibility layer and each platform does require a unique implementation. These limitations have been marked in Table 1 using the "Partial support" symbol.
Both iFrames and standalone websites are built on commonly deployed approaches, and work on all platforms and browsers. iFrames on mobile can be implemented using either bookmarklets or an application proxy. In the case of bookmarklets, iFrames are limited by websites' CSP policies, and in the case of a proxy application on mobile devices, there is the degradation of user experience (marked as "Partial support" in Table 1 ).
Usability
The standalone strategies suffer from a lack of integration, which is disliked by users [30, 1] . On the other hand, because the standalone strategies are not tied to the website's interface, the standalone strategies support non-standard interfaces (e.g., input field drawn using an HTML canvas). While the integrated strategies could contain logic to handle website-specific interfaces, this approach is a significant engineering effort (marked as "Partial support" in Table 1 ).
The standalone website strategy does not require installation. When the iFrame strategy is implemented using bookmarklets, there is also no installation. 
2 ShadowDOM is not fully supported in Chrome. 3 Depends on whether the browser is accessible. 4 In development -AT-SPI [42] . 5 Potentially limited by CSP. 6 Integrated with the browser, but not the website. 
Security
The Greasemonkey, accessibility, and standalone app strategies all rely on the browser's sandbox for security [7] . The sandbox prevents websites from being able to access any resources outside of the websites DOM, including the browser chrome (Greasemonkey) and other applications (accessibility, standalone app). While the browser's sandbox has been compromised in the past, such attacks are quickly patched [43] .
The iFrame and standalone website strategies rely on the browser's same-origin policy for security [4, 16] . As part of this policy, browsers ensure that code executing on an arbitrary website is unable to access or modify content hosted on a different domain (i.e., iFrame, standalone website). This is an important model that provides security for much of the Web [34] .
Similar to compromises of the browser sandbox, from time to time the same-origin policy is partially broken. For example, in 2013 Paul Stone described an attack that used CSS and measurements of render times to leak the contents of an iFrame [35] . After disclosure of this flaw, the browser vendors worked with Stone and quickly addressed the issue. This is the advantage of relying on a security model actively supported by browsers: problems are quickly fixed.
Shadow DOM is the one approach that does not rely on a standard security model, but instead requires developers to modify the JavaScript environment to prevent websites from accessing the contents of a ShadowRoot. The dangers of this approach can be seen through a security analysis we conducted of ShadowCrypt. We downloaded the latest version of ShadowCrypt 9 and found two attacks that allowed Web applications to read plaintext data stored in the secure overlays. The JavaScript to run these attacks and explanation of why they work are given in Figure 3 These attacks demonstrate two problems with relying on developers to add security to the Shadow DOM. First, it is difficult for developers to correctly identify all attack vectors and correctly close them (Figure 3 -Attack 1) . Second, console . log ( newShadowRoot . ol derS had owRo ot . querySelector ( ' textarea ' ) . value ) ;
7 } Attack 1. Steals content from ShadowCrypt elements by creating a new ShadowRoot and using it to access ShadowCrypt's ShadowRoot. ShadowCrypt stores content in a TextArea and so we extract it from there. This attack is possible because ShadowCrypt deletes the Document.createShadowRoot function instead of the Document.prototype.createShadowRoot function. JavaScript-based Cryptography.
The iFrame, Shadow DOM, Greasemonkey, and standalone website strategies all rely upon cryptographic primitives implemented in JavaScript. There have been concerns that in certain cases JavaScript-based cryptography is untrustworthy [18] . These arguments reduce to two different con- cerns. First, if cryptography is being used because TLS is not trusted by the website, then the website cannot guarantee that the JavaScript is delivered to the user's browser unmodified. Second, if cryptography is being used to encrypt the data so that it is opaque to the website, then you cannot trust the website to send you JavaScript that will encrypt this data. Both of these are valid concerns, but are orthogonal to the strategies that use JavaScript-based cryptography. First, the strategies do trust TLS to correctly deliver the userto-user encryption software. Second, the strategies do not trust the website, and that is precisely why the encryption software is separate from the website. Finally, except in the case of iFrames implemented using Bookmarklets, the cryptographic JavaScript code is only downloaded once, at installation (iFrame, Shadow DOM, Greasemonkey) or on first run (standalone website).
Hybrid Strategies
The comparison of implementation strategies shows that the iFrames and accessibility strategies best match our goals of retrofitting the Web with user-to-user encryption. Still, both of these approaches struggle with non-standard interfaces. To address this, we suggest that each of these strategies be modified to fall back to a standalone strategy when users encounter a non-standard interface that the system was unable to overlay. We pair strategies that have the same security model: i.e., iFrame + standalone website (sameorigin) and Accessibility + standalone app (browser sandbox). The capabilities of these new hybrid approaches are summarized in Table 2 .
Using the hybrid strategies, a bookmarklet implementation of iFrames can protect websites that don't employ CSP, and for those websites that do use CSP, the implementation can fall back to the standalone website. This standalone website could be displayed in either a new window or tab. Alternatively, when a user encounters a non-standard interface that is not overlayed, they could click a button to launch the standalone website. This allows iFrames to fully support mobile platforms without using a proxy application. Additionally, this means that the no-install implementation of iFrames (i.e., bookmarklets) is available for all browsers and platforms.
Best Strategy
Based on our goal of retrofitting the Web with user-to-user encryption, the hybrid strategy iFrames + standalone website is the best strategy. It works with all current browsers and platforms, both mobile and desktop. Furthermore, in most situations it provides tight integration with websites, but can fall back to a standalone website when non-standard interfaces are encountered. Moreover, using bookmarklets, this strategy can be run on systems where the user does not have install permissions.
MESSAGEGUARD
Using the hybrid iFrame + standalone website strategy, we created MessageGuard. MessageGuard is the first system that retrofits the entire Web with user-to-user encryption and works with all websites, in all browsers, on all platforms, both desktop and mobile. It is also the only system that attempts to address all of the system goals we identified for user-to-user encryption (Section 2.2). Figure 4 shows an overview of MessageGuard's architecture. MessageGuard's workflow is as follows:
1. MessageGuard injects the front end component into the website's front end. MessageGuard's front end component scans for encrypted payloads and data entry interfaces. When found, it replaces these items with an overlay. After this initial scan, changes to the page are tracked and only elements that have been modified are scanned.
2. Read overlays are used to display sensitive information to the user, and a compose overlay allows users to encrypt sensitive information before sending it to the website. Each overlay is displayed within an iframe and uses the browser's same-origin policy to protect its contents from the website, which sees only ciphertext. Overlays use the packager component to handle the actual encryption/decryption and packaging of data.
3. In conjunction with the key management component, the packager encrypts and decrypts data. The packager also encodes encrypted data, making it suitable for transmission to and from the website.
Front End
MessageGuard's front end component is injected into every website. The front end has three responsibilities:
1. Identify encrypted payloads. The front end identifies encrypted payloads, overlays these payloads with a read overlay, and sends the payloads to the overlay so that they can be decrypted and displayed to the user ( Figure 5 ). 2. Identify data entry interfaces. The front end identifies interfaces where the user may wish to enter encrypted data (e.g., TextArea, ContentEditable). Each of these interfaces is then modified to display a button that users can click to replace the interface with a compose overlay ( Figure 6 ) (Goal8: Controllable).The front end also handles passing data between the the compose overlay and the website (e.g., initial message contents, saving drafts).
3. Displaying context-sensitive tutorials. The front end displays tutorials that instruct new users how to use MessageGuard. These are all context-sensitive, appearing as the user performs a given task for the first time (Goal5: Simple).
The front end is the only MessageGuard component that runs outside of MessageGuard's protected origin. For this reason, MessageGuard is designed to treat the front end as untrusted. Since the front end component does not exist as part of MessageGuard's protected origin, it cannot directly access the packager, key management, or overlay components. Instead, it is limited to communicating with the overlay component using the web messaging API [39] . Additionally, the overlay always encrypts user data before transmitting it to the front end component and sanitizes any data it receives from the front end.
Overlays
MessageGuard's overlays are designed to mimic the placement and dimensions of the content they overlay (Goal6: Seamless, Goal7: Reactive) and to be visually appealing and intuitive (Goal5: Simple). Overlays have a distinctive, dark color scheme that stands out from most website, allowing users to easily identify secure overlays from insecure website interfaces (Goal3: Secure). There is also a user-selected watermark displayed in each overlay that further differentiates it from interfaces created by the website, 10 though research into potentially better indicators is ongoing. Finally, overlays sanitize the plaintext contents of encrypted messages in order to prevent malicious messages from compromising the overlay. 10 For readability, the watermark is not shown in the figures. MessageGuard includes two standard overlays: a read overlay ( Figure 5 ) and a compose overlay (Figure 6 ).
11 Read overlays are responsible for decrypting and displaying sensitive information to users. Compose overlays allow users to compose rich text messages and encrypt these messages before sending them to the website. Both overlays are reactive and modify their behavior based on available space (Goal7: Reactive). For example, at small sizes, the compose overlay no longer shows tools for formatting text, but still allows their use through keyboard shortcuts (Figure 7 ).
Packager
The packager encrypts/decrypts user data and encodes the encrypted data to make it suitable for use with websites. The packager uses standard cryptographic primitives and techniques to encrypt/decrypt data (e.g., AES-CCM).
Ciphertext is packaged with all information necessary for recipients of the message to decrypt it. Currently, the packager uses a custom package format that has been optimized to reduce its footprint, allowing it to be compatible with websites that limit the length of content (e.g., chat applications). The package data is then Base64 encoded. 
Key Management
MessageGuard's key management back end is flexible and allows for the deployment of various key management schemes (e.g., shared secrets, PGP, IBE). In practice, this could be used by researchers to compare different key management schemes while holding the front end constant.
In our MessageGuard prototype, we used Identity-based Encryption [5] (IBE) for our key management scheme. Similar to how MessageGuard secures websites without requiring changes to the website, IBE allows messages to be encrypted for a user without requiring the user to first perform key management (Goal4: Automatic). We considered using PGP in our MessageGuard prototype, but PGP has a long history of being unusable [41, 33, 13] and in our own experimentation we found that this still holds true [29] . In contrast, IBE-like systems have consistently been shown to be usable [10, 30, 28] .
Customization
MessageGuard is able to overlay standard HTML interfaces on all websites (Goal1: Ubiquitous). For websites that use non-standard interfaces, MessageGuard allows for per-website customization. This customization can also be used to enhance the default experience provided by MessageGuard (Goal6: Seamless).
For example, in Gmail the default behavior of MessageGuard marks the To field for possible encryption (with an On/Off button) and requires users to enter email recipients in two different locations (Figure 8 ). Using MessageGuard's customization functionality, we were able to address these issues. First, we modified Gmail to use a custom overlay that allows users to include images and links ( Figure 9 ). Second, we modified Gmail's interface to indicate to users which fields were not encrypted and allow the composition of an unencrypted preamble to their sensitive information. Third, we modified the packager to wrap the encoded data inside an email message that instructs the user to download MessageGuard and install it to read their message. (Figure 10) . Last, we modified the front end to provide specialized tutorials on how to use MessageGuard with email.
Implementation
We implemented MessageGuard as both a browser extension and as a bookmarklet. MessageGuard's implementation only relies on JavaScript functionality that is available in all major browsers. This has the benefit that MessageGuard runs on all major desktop and mobile browsers, and that it will also work with smaller browsers that support standard JavaScript functionality.
MessageGuard was developed use a modern toolset that includes NodeJS, Gulp, Browserify, and Kango. This allows us to leverage quality JavaScript libraries, simplify development and deployment, and generate documentation. This will assist developers and researchers who wish to use or contribute to MessageGuard. We are in the process of preparing MessageGuard to be open sourced, and by the conference MessageGuard and its source will be available at https://messageguard.io.
VALIDATION
We evaluated MessageGuard in terms of deployability, performance, and usability.
Deployability
We tested MessageGuard on major browsers and it worked in all cases: Desktop -Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Opera, and Safari. Android -Chrome, Firefox, Opera. iOS -Chrome, Mercury, Safari.
We tested MessageGuard on the Alexa top 50 Web sites. One of the sites is not a Web application (t.co) and another requires a Chinese phone number in order to use it (weibo.com). MessageGuard was able to encrypt data in 47 of the 48 remaining Web applications. The one site that failed (youtube.com) did so because the application removed the comments field when it lost focus, which happens when focus switched to MessageGuard's compose overlay. We were able to address this problem with a customized front end that required only five lines of code to implement.
Performance
We profiled MessageGuard on several popular Web applications and analyzed MessageGuard's impact on load times. In each case, we started the profiler, reloaded the page, and stopped profiling once the page was loaded. Our results show that MessageGuard has little impact on page load times and does not degrade the user's experience as they surf the Web: Facebook -0.93%, Gmail -2.92%, Disqus -0.54%, Twitter -1.98%.
Since MessageGuard is intended to work with all websites, we created a synthetic Web app that allowed us to test MessageGuard's performance in extreme situations. This app measures MessageGuard's performance when overlaying static content present at page load (Stage 1) and when overlaying dynamic content that is added to the page after load (Stage 2). The application takes as input n, the num-Stage Static Dynamic n 100 500 1000 100 500 1000 ber elements that will be overlayed in each stage. Half of these elements will require read overlays and half will require compose overlays.
Using this synthetic Web application, we tested MessageGuard with six browsers and three values of n. We averaged measurements over ten runs and report our findings in Table 3. Performance for overlaying static content does not significantly vary based on the number of overlays created. In contrast, performance for overlaying dynamic content for most browsers seems to grow polynomial in the number of overlays added. Still, performance in the Firefox desktop browser demonstrates that this is not an inherent limitation of MessageGuard. Finally, we note that even in extreme cases (dynamic -n = 1000) overlaying occurs quickly (max 61 ms).
Usability
The design and implementation of MessageGuard was guided by seven IRB-approved laboratory usability studies involving a total of 220 participants [26, 30, 27, 28] . These studies examined two prototype versions of MessageGuard. Tasks for the studies included using Facebook Chat and Gmail to send encrypted messages.
All studies but the first utilized a standard usability metric, the System Usability Scale (SUS) [2, 3] . SUS generates a single score between 0 and 100 to rate a system's overall usability. SUS consists of ten discriminating questions that users answer after completing tasks using a system. In our early studies, we achieved SUS scores in the low 70's, but after addressing issues discovered during these early studies, the most recent prototype of MessageGuard received a SUS score of 80.0 [27] . A SUS score of 80.0 represents "excellent" usability [2, 31] , and is in the 85th to 90th percentile of a large number of systems tested with SUS [32] .
13
In that same study, we asked participants to indicate whether they were interested in encrypting sensitive email. In their responses, 83% of participants expressed a desire to begin using MessageGuard to secure their data. Moreover, nearly all participants (92%) believed that their friends and family could easily start using MessageGuard.
In several of our studies [30, 28] , participants used both 13 The percentiles are for all applications, not just security applications.
the MessageGuard prototype and an existing secure email system: Voltage, Encipher.it, Tutanota, or Virtru. Participants rated MessageGuard as being substantially more usable than Voltage, Encipher.it, and Tutanota, and ranked MessageGuard as being equally usable with Virtru.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss lessons learned and observations made while designing and implementing MessageGuard.
As we were developing MessageGuard, it became clear that current JavaScript cryptographic libraries are lacking. Some libraries have a limited selection of encryption schemes and modes (e.g., Crypto-JS) while others had poor API design and were confusing (e.g., SJCL). Based on our experience, we have the following two suggestions: First, work on the JavaScript Web Crypto API [24] needs to be accelerated in order to provide developers with a standardized, trustworthy, and efficient crypto API. Second, JavaScript crypto libraries need to expose building-block operations (e.g., elliptic curve addition and multiplication) in order to allow developers to add support for unsupported schemes (e.g., IBE).
We also learned that except for Firefox on Android, mobile browsers do not support extensions. This means that bookmarklets are the only universal mechanism for users to modify or extend their mobile browsers. As such, it is disappointing that even though the Content Security Policy (CSP) specification allows for bookmarklets to be exempted from CSP [38] , browsers have not chosen to do so. We strongly recommend that browsers follow existing recommendations by the community [24, 17] and exempt bookmarklets from CSP in order to give users control of their mobile browsing experience.
Finally, we are intrigued by the ability of the accessibility strategy (see Section 3.1.4) to overlay non-browser applications. Even though the limitations of this strategy made it unsuitable for MessageGuard, certain changes could help it become a preferred approach. First, a single platformneutral accessibility framework implemented across all operating systems could reduce the development burden for this strategy (e.g., AT-SPI [42] ). Second, iOS and mobile Windows need to allow for the installation of accessibility tool apps. Last, the accessibility layer should be more generalized so that non-accessibility tools (e.g., security tools) can leverage it.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed and compared potential implementation strategies for retrofitting the Web with user-touser encryption. Our analysis shows that a hybrid approach using iFrames plus aspects of a standalone website is the only way to support user-to-user encryption without requiring modifications to websites or browsers.
We also present the design and implementation of MessageGuard, the first system that retrofits the existing Web with user-to-user encryption and that is designed to work with all applications, in all browsers, on all platforms. MessageGuard bridges the gap between the need for secure userto-user communication and the capabilities of current browsers and websites. We show that MessageGuard works everywhere and can be deployed today, has little impact on page load times, and has high usability.
